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I. INTRODUCTION 
New technologies and methods of surveillance widely change the 
impact of constitutional rights in society. First, the United States Supreme 
Court addressed telephonic surveillance.1  Then, the Supreme Court 
addressed the developments of technologies such as airplane surveillance,2 
thermal imaging,3 and global positioning system (GPS) surveillance.4 
Now, there is video and pole camera surveillance. 
Video surveillance does not ordinarily present constitutional or 
statutory problems.  It is a longstanding principle that a reasonable 
expectation of privacy does not exist when there is voluntary exposure of 
a defendant’s actions to third parties.5  But, issues with video surveillance 
typically arise where there is a “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
attached to the area being monitored. 
The Supreme Court has not been completely silent as to the general 
topic of video surveillance.  In United States v. Katz, the Court developed 
a non-statutory analysis to govern recording electronic surveillance.6  The 
relevant federal statutes that govern the interception of wire, oral, and 
electronic communication are silent as to video-only7 camera 
																																																																																																																												
 1 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 2 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 
(1986). 
 3 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 4 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). 
 5 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (finding no privacy interest in 
telephone numbers dialed); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753–54 (1971) (finding 
no privacy interest in what someone voluntarily reveals to a false friend). 
 6 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361–62; see also United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(discussing an apartment interior); United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 
1992) (en banc) (discussing a business office interior); United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 
F.2d 1433 (10th Cir. 1990) (discussing a warehouse-like building interior); United States 
v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1987) (discussing a backyard); United States v. 
Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1986 (discussing a private business office); United States 
v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984) (discussing  a terrorist safehouse); Cf. United States 
v. Williams, 124 F.3d 411 (3rd Cir. 1997) (discussing an office interior). 
 7 M. Wesley Clark, Pole Cameras and Surreptitious Surveillance, FBI LAW 
ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN, Nov. 2009, at 23. 
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surveillance.8  Therefore, the critical question in the analysis is whether a 
person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.9 
If a reasonable expectation of privacy is found to exist, then the 
Fourth Amendment typically requires law enforcement to obtain a warrant 
unless an exception applies.10  Conversely, if a reasonable expectation of 
privacy is not found to exist, then the Fourth Amendment does not apply.11  
In general, law enforcement’s observations of a person’s “comings and 
goings,” occurring outside of a dwelling or within a curtilage, do not 
amount to a Fourth Amendment search or seizure.12 
One of the most common types of video surveillance methods is the 
pole camera.  Law enforcement utilizes pole cameras in circumstances 
when it is operationally impractical to conduct physical surveillance or 
where suspects engage in counter-surveillance.13  The view from a pole 
camera is arguably “nothing more than a utility worker would have if he 
was performing job-related duties atop the pole.”14  Law enforcement can 
affix pole cameras with the consent of the utility company and without a 
court order permitting installation to monitor a specific area, also known 
as an “installation or authorizing monitoring order.”15 
Provisions of the Federal Wiretap Act provide statutory guidance for 
certain types of communications.  Specifically, Title III provides the 
statutory framework that governs real-time electronic surveillance of the 
contents of communications.16  Title III is currently inapplicable to video 
surveillance.17  Nevertheless, a majority of the federal circuit courts have 
construed some of the Title III requirements to apply to video surveillance 
warrants.18  But, there needs to be consistent uniformity throughout the 
Circuit Courts of Appeals with a constitutional issue of this magnitude. 
In California v. Ciraolo, the Supreme Court confronted the question 
of whether the Fourth Amendment was violated by a warrantless aerial 
observation from an altitude of 1,000 feet of a fenced-in backyard within 
																																																																																																																												
 8 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (2015); 50 U.S.C. §1801 et seq. (2015). 
 9 Clark, supra, note 7, at 24. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Dow Chemical v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235–36 (1986) (noting that Fourth 
Amendment protection can and do reach commercial establishments). 
 13 Clark, supra, note 7, at 23. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. 
 17 United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 539 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 885 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 18 United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1994); Koyomejian, 970 F.2d at 542; 
United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Cuevas-
Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 
1986; Torres, 751 F.2d 875; Cf. United States v. Williams, 124 F.3d 411 (3rd Cir. 1997). 
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the curtilage of a home.19  The Court ultimately held that the Fourth 
Amendment was not violated because the defendant held an expectation 
of privacy that society was unwilling to recognize.20  As a result, the 
Circuit Courts of Appeals have interpreted Ciraolo differently in 
determining whether a search warrant is required to conduct pole camera 
surveillance in the vicinity of a defendant’s residence. 
The Fifth Circuit has examined the issue of pole camera surveillance 
of backyards as a matter of first impression.21  The Fifth Circuit narrowly 
applied Ciraolo, holding that curtilage, deliberately protected from 
observation by ordinary passersby, requires a warrant for video 
surveillance.22  Although not directly opposing the Fifth Circuit’s stance, 
the Tenth Circuit has held that warrantless pole camera surveillance from 
a pole camera does not violate the Fourth Amendment where there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy, since the cameras are capable of 
observing what any passerby would easily be able to observe.23 
It is necessary for the courts to broadly interpret Ciraolo when 
applying the decision to video surveillance.  This Comment suggests that 
a broad interpretation of Ciraolo not only comports with the analysis of 
similar technological advancements, but also produces the same result 
under both trespass and privacy theories.  The consensus among various 
circuit courts is that video surveillance does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment as long as law enforcement follows the four requirements of 
Title III, as well as the ordinary requirement of a finding of probable cause, 
despite the fact that Title III does not explicitly cover video surveillance.  
Additionally, the legislature should amend Title III to encompass video 
surveillance, thereby providing a more definitive analysis and creating 
uniformity within the federal circuit courts.  If, however, the legislature 
does not amend Title III, a majority of the circuit courts holdings suggest 
that the Fourth Amendment analysis should be applied. 
In developing this argument, Part II of this Comment sets forth an 
overview of Fourth Amendment searches, as well as the relationship 
between the Fourth Amendment and video surveillance.  Part III examines 
the current state of the law with regard to video surveillance.  Part IV 
analyzes constitutional and statutory concerns, as well as policy 
considerations.  Finally, Part V reiterates why the broad interpretation of 
																																																																																																																												
 19 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1985). 
 20 Id. at 212–14. 
 21 Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d at 250–52. 
 22 Id. 
 23 United States v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 1269, 1281 (10th Cir. 2000), vacated on other 
grounds, 531 U.S. 1033 (2000). 
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Ciraolo must be followed and why Title III must be amended to produce 
consistency within the lower courts. 
II. BACKGROUND 
 A. Historical Overview of Fourth Amendment Searches 
While the text of the Fourth Amendment has remained the same, 
technologies have progressed beyond the Founding Fathers’ wildest 
dreams.  The Fourth Amendment protects “the right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”24  Probable cause is necessary for a warrant to be 
issued, and it must be “supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.”25  Case law has clarified that warrantless searches are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, unless a specific exception, 
such as exigent circumstances or consent, applies.26 
The Founding Fathers created the Fourth Amendment as a response 
to British search and seizure practices, in particular the use of writs of 
assistance, which allotted broad latitude to customs officials to search 
houses, shops, cellars, warehouses, and other places for smuggled items.27  
Early Americans challenged this practice as “plac[ing] the liberty of every 
man in the hands of every petty officer.”28  Additionally, early Americans 
were concerned with the privacy of the home and the possibility of abuse 
by government officials, which would result in oppression.29 
The Supreme Court established some guidelines in order to clarify 
one’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” in Katz v. United States.30  The 
two-part inquiry established in Katz examines (1) whether the individual 
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the 
challenged scope and (2) whether society is willing to recognize that 
expectation as reasonable.31  Therefore, “what a person knowingly exposes 
to the public, even in his own home or office” does not trigger Fourth 
																																																																																																																												
 24 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 357 (1967)). 
 27 M. Blane Michael, Reading the Fourth Amendment: Guidance from the Mischief 
that Gave it Birth, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 905, 907–09 (2010). 
 28 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886). 
 29 Id. 
 30 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 
(Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 31 Id. at 361. 
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Amendment protection.32  Furthermore, it is permissible for law 
enforcement to utilize its resources to conduct surveillance where it has a 
legal right to occupy without a warrant.33 
There are three categorical areas examined when confronted with 
Fourth Amendment issues. These areas include the home, curtilage, and 
open fields.34  The sanctity of the home is expressly protected within the 
text of the Fourth Amendment and has been repeatedly recognized in case 
law.35  The Supreme Court has defined curtilage as the area that 
immediately surrounds or is adjacent to the home, which the activity of the 
home life extends.36  The Court has afforded curtilage similar protection 
to the home since it is “sufficiently intimate” that it is related and protected 
as if it were part of a person’s residence.37  In determining whether 
surrounding property is “sufficiently intimate,” the Court identified four 
factors to be considered, which include (1) the closeness of the area in 
question to the home; (2) whether this area is within an enclosure 
surrounding the dwelling; (3) the manner in which the area is used; and 
(4) the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by 
passersby.38  The Court noted that no one factor is determinative, and not 
all four factors have to be present before a person is able to conclude that 
an area under consideration is to be considered curtilage.39 
Lastly, there is the area of open fields, which is the area that extends 
beyond the curtilage. Fourth Amendment protection does not extend to 
open fields areas. Unlike the home, open fields “do not provide the setting 
for those intimate activities” that the Fourth Amendment protects.40  Thus, 
there is no legitimate expectation of privacy that attaches to open fields.41 
Notwithstanding the three categorical areas, the Fourth Amendment 
does not prohibit law enforcement from “augmenting the sensory faculties 
bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and 
																																																																																																																												
 32 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361–62. 
 33 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989) (quoting Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213) 
(“[T]he police may see what may be seen ‘from a public vantage point where [they have] 
a right to be[.]’”); United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir. 1978) 
(“Permissible techniques of surveillance include more than the five senses of officers and 
their unaided physical abilities.”). 
 34 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987). 
 35 See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (citing Payton v. New 
York, 455 U.S. 573, 601 (1980)); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); 
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). 
 36 This is prototypically the backyard or porch area. 
 37 Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Oliver, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984). 
 41 Id. 
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technology afforded them.”42  In applying this concept, the Ninth Circuit 
has permitted law enforcement to use photographic equipment to gather 
evidence.43  Notably, the Ninth Circuit characterized the technique as “a 
prudent and efficient use of modern technology.”44  As will further be 
discussed later in this Section, there are parameters to this type of 
surveillance.45 
 B. The Fourth Amendment as Applied to Technological 
Advancements in Surveillance Methods 
Over the years, the Supreme Court has confronted technological 
advancements with regard to law enforcement surveillance methods.  The 
Court clarified the “right to privacy” and defined a “search” under the 
Fourth Amendment in Katz v. United States.46  In the years following Katz, 
the Court discussed other methods of surveillance, such as aerial 
surveillance, thermal imaging surveillance, global positioning system 
(“GPS”) surveillance, and electronic tracking.47  The Court undoubtedly 
needs to address other technological advancements, such as drones used 
by law enforcement for surveillance purposes, in the future. 
1. Telephonic Surveillance 
In Katz, the Supreme Court addressed the concept of the “right to 
privacy” and what constituted a “search” under the Fourth Amendment.48  
The FBI utilized an electronic eavesdropping device to record the 
defendant’s phone calls made via a public pay phone.49  The nature of 
defendant’s calls involved transmitting illegal gambling wagers.50  The 
Court ultimately found that the government’s activities in electronically 
listening to and recording the defendant violated his reasonable 
expectation of privacy and constituted a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.51 
																																																																																																																												
 42 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983). 
 43 United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 44 Id. 
 45 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (prohibiting the use of thermal 
imaging surveillance without a warrant). 
 46 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 47 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (discussing aerial surveillance); Florida 
v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (discussing aerial surveillance); Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27 
(discussing thermal imaging surveillance); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) 
(discussing GPS surveillance). 
 48 Katz, 389 U.S. 347. 
 49 Id. at 348. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 359. 
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Importantly, the Court abandoned the trespass theory and adopted 
the privacy theory in Katz. Justice Harlan, writing for the concurrence, 
established a two-part test, with the underlying theory that “the Fourth 
Amendment protects people not places.” 52  The two-part test for 
determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists includes 
examining whether (1) the individual “has exhibited an actual expectation 
of privacy,” and (2) whether society is prepared to recognize that this 
expectation is reasonable.”53  Thus, this analysis is both subjective and 
objective. 
2. Aerial Surveillance 
In California v. Ciraolo, the Supreme Court addressed the question 
of whether naked-eye aerial observation without a warrant from an altitude 
of 1,000 feet of a fenced-in backyard within the curtilage of a home was 
permissible under the United States Constitution.54  Police utilized an 
airplane from an altitude of 1,000 feet to observe a fenced-in backyard 
within the curtilage of defendant’s home.55  The police did not use sensory 
enhancing technology, but instead, their own eyes.56  Ultimately, the Court 
held that this type of naked-eye aerial observation did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment.57 
The Court engaged in the two-part Katz analysis, and noted that the 
fence served the purpose of concealing the marijuana crop because the 
“defendant took normal precautions to maintain his privacy,” specifically 
by using “a six-foot outer fence and a ten-foot inner fence.”58  The Court 
found that it was inconclusive whether defendant manifested a “subjective 
expectation of privacy from all observations of his backyard” or “whether 
instead he manifested merely a hope that no one would observe his 
unlawful gardening pursuits . . . ”59  Furthermore, the Court noted that the 
ten foot fence “might not [have] shield[ed] these plants from the eyes of a 
citizen or policeman perched on top of a truck or a two-level bus.”60 
As to the second part of the analysis under Katz, the Court concluded 
that defendant’s expectation that his marijuana garden was protected from 
such observation was not recognized by society as a reasonable 
																																																																																																																												
 52 Id. at 361–62 (emphasis added). 
 53 Id. 
 54 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 207 (1986). 
 55 Id. at 209. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 213–15. 
 58 Id. at 209–211. 
 59 Id. at 211–12. 
 60 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211–12. 
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expectation of privacy.61  Specifically, the Court emphasized that the 
Fourth Amendment does not require police to obtain a warrant “in order 
to observe what is visible to the naked eye.”62 
Shortly after Ciraolo was decided, the Court again addressed the 
question of aerial surveillance in Florida v. Riley.63  In Riley, the Court 
considered whether observation of the interior of a greenhouse within the 
curtilage of a residence from a helicopter 400 feet above was a search that 
required a warrant.64  While the overhead flight observation in Riley was 
more intrusive compared to Ciraolo, and surely less stealthy, a plurality of 
the Court held that the surveillance did not violate defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment rights because the helicopter complied with aviation 
regulations.65  The Court noted that “intimate details” which were 
connected with the use of the home or the curtilage were not observed.66  
Because members of the public could have legally taken the exact 
helicopter ride 400 feet above the defendant’s home and witness 
defendant’s “illegal horticultural display,” the police were also permitted 
to do so.67 
But the use of an airplane or helicopter to surveil suspects is not 
necessarily a “free pass” for law enforcement.  The Court has recently 
clarified that visual observation of the home from public navigable 
airspace must be “done in a physically nonintrusive manner.”68  In Florida 
v. Jardines, the Court distinguished a physically intrusive dog sniff search 
from visual aerial surveillance.69  Thus, the concern seems to be regarding 
investigative methods that are physically intrusive, rather than easily 
observable. 
3. Thermal Imaging Surveillance 
In Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the warrantless 
use of a thermal imaging device to reveal the relative amount of heat 
released from the various rooms of a defendant’s home amounted to search 
that violated the Fourth Amendment.70  The Court held that the 
surveillance rose to the level of a “search.”71  The Court found that this 
																																																																																																																												
 61 Id. at 213–15. 
 62 Id. at 215. 
 63 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445. 
 64 Riley, 488 U.S. at 447–49. 
 65 Id. at 450–52. 
 66 Id. at 452. 
 67 Id. at 451; see also Clark, supra, note 7 at 28. 
 68 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415 (2013) (citation omitted). 
 69 Id. at 1415–17. 
 70 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 71 Id. at 34–35. 
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type of search is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant where law 
enforcement explores intimate details of the home, which could be 
determined without a physical intrusion via a device that is not in general 
public use.72 
Whether a technology falls within the scope of the Kyllo rule depends 
on at least two factors.  First, in order for the Kyllo rule to apply, the 
technology must not be in “general public use.”73  In addition, the Kyllo 
rule applies to the technology that reveals information about the interior 
of the home.74 
Defendants have attempted to invoke the Kyllo rule in cases where 
the government used cell tower information or an electronic device to 
locate a cell phone.75  Specifically, a district court in the Seventh Circuit 
rejected a Kyllo challenge to the use of an electronic device to locate a cell 
phone because cell phones transmit signals to parties outside a home.76  
The district court reasoned that the cell phone signals were knowingly 
exposed to the third-party cell phone company.77  Under federal law, there 
is no expectation of privacy in pieces of data that are voluntarily disclosed 
to a third party.78 
4. Global Positioning System (“GPS”) Surveillance and Electronic 
Tracking 
The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment is not 
violated when law enforcement monitors a beeper without a warrant, 
revealing information that could have been obtained through visual 
surveillance.79  But the recent decision in United States v. Jones has altered 
the landscape for electronic tracking.  In Jones, federal law enforcement 
officers attached a GPS device to a suspect’s vehicle, without a valid 
warrant, and pinpointed the vehicle’s movements to within fifty to one 
																																																																																																																												
 72 Id. at 40. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. (“We have said that the Fourth Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance to 
the house.” (emphasis added) (quoting Payton v. New York, 455 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 75 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic 
Evidence in Criminal Investigations 15 (2009). 
 76 United States v. Bermudez, 2006 WL 3197181 (S.D. Ind. June 30, 2006), aff’d 509 
F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 77 Id. 
 78 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (finding no privacy interest in 
telephone numbers dialed). 
 79 Compare United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (monitoring of a beeper does 
not violate the Fourth Amendment when it reveals no information that could not have been 
obtained through visual surveillance) with United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) 
(monitoring of a beeper violates the Fourth Amendment when it reveals information that 
could not have been obtained through visual surveillance, and a warrant is required). 
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hundred feet for approximately one month.80  The Court held that the 
physical intrusion of a GPS device on a vehicle constituted a Fourth 
Amendment search and thus required a search warrant.81 
The parties argued solely on privacy theory grounds, as opposed to 
trespass theory, because it simply was not utilized since Katz in 1967.  
While the Court unanimously agreed that a search occurred, the Court was 
divided over analyzing the case under trespass and privacy theories.82  The 
prevailing concern was that if law enforcement monitored a person over a 
long period of time, non-criminal information could be learned about 
them.83  Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, based the opinion on trespass 
grounds, and distinguished law enforcement’s actions here with attaching 
a listening device to a phone booth.84  Justice Scalia reasoned that in order 
to attach the GPS device to the undercarriage of the vehicle, law 
enforcement must invade the physicality of the vehicle, thus obviously 
resulting in a physical intrusion.85 
 C. Relevant Federal Wiretap Statutes Which are Applicable Only to 
Oral, Wire, and Electronic Communications 
Federal wiretap statutes govern three kinds of communications – 
wire, oral, and electronic.86  Wire communications are defined as: 
[A]ny aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of 
facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of 
wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin 
and the point of reception (including the use of such connection in 
a switching station) furnished or operated by any person engaged 
in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of 
interstate or foreign communications or communications affecting 
interstate or foreign commerce.87 
The most important requirement is the human voice.88  If a human 
voice is not contained within a communication, then it is not considered to 
be a wire communication.89  Oral communications are defined as “any oral 
																																																																																																																												
 80 United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 948 (2012). 
 81 Id. at 949. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 950. 
 85 Id. at 949. 
 86 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. 
 87 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1). 
 88 Judish, supra, note 69, at 162; see also § 2510(18) (defining “aural transfer” as a 
“transfer containing the human voice any point between and including the point of origin 
and the point of reception”). 
 89 Id. at 162–63. 
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communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such 
communication is not subject to interception under circumstances 
justifying such expectation, but such term does not include any electronic 
communication.”90 
Lastly, electronic communications are defined in a “broad, catch-all” 
category, as: 
[A]ny transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sound, data, or 
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, 
radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system 
that affects interstate or foreign commerce, but does not include – 
(A) any wire or oral communication; (B) any communication 
made through a tone-only paging device; (C) any communication 
from a tracking device . . . or (D) electronic funds transfer 
information stored by a financial institution in a communications 
system used for the electronic storage and transfer of funds.91 
Obtaining electronic communication data and electronic surveillance 
in general raise the most legal issues.  Two statutes primarily govern real-
time electronic surveillance in federal criminal investigations.  The 
Wiretap Statute (“Title III”)92 and the Pen Registers and Trap and Trace 
Devices statute (“Pen/Trap”)93 regulate access to different types of 
information.  Title III permits the government to obtain the contents of 
wire and electronic communications in transmission.94  The questions that 
agents and prosecutors must ask to ensure compliance with Title III are 
relatively straightforward: 
(1) Is the communication to be monitored one of the protected 
communications defined in 18 U.S.C. §2510? 
(2) Will the proposed surveillance lead to an “interception” of the 
communications? 
(3) If the answer to the first two questions is “yes,” does a statutory 
exception apply that permits the interception?95 
In contrast, the Pen/Trap Statute is concerned with the real-time 
collection of addressing and other non-content information relating to 
																																																																																																																												
 90 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2). 
 91 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12). 
 92 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. 
 93 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (2015). 
 94 18 U.S.C. § 2513 (2015). 
 95 Judish, supra, note 69, at 161–62. 
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those communications.96  The Pen/Trap Statute is inapplicable to this 
Comment. 
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW 
 A. Fourth Amendment Concerns – Interpreting California v. 
Ciraolo 
1. The Fifth Circuit 
In United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, law enforcement suspected that 
drug traffickers were using the defendant’s property.97  Based upon their 
suspicions, federal law enforcement officers obtained a court order before 
installing a pole camera on defendant’s property.98  The pole camera 
enabled law enforcement to “peer over” a ten-foot high fence at the back 
of the defendant’s yard within the curtilage.99  The court order relied upon 
an “extensive affidavit,” and the application “explained that conventional 
law enforcement techniques, although attempted, had failed to uncover 
enough evidence to convict the drug traffickers.”100  The order limited the 
initial surveillance period to thirty days, mandated minimization, and 
directed law enforcement to discontinue the surveillance when the 
suspected participants were not on the premises.101 
The Fifth Circuit held that the defendant had exhibited a subjective 
expectation of privacy by virtue of the fence that “screen[ed] the activity 
from casual observers.”102  The court also noted that the area which the 
pole camera surveilled amounted to “the curtilage of his home an area 
protected by traditional Fourth Amendment analysis.”103  The Fifth Circuit 
characterized pole camera surveillance as “provok[ing] an immediate 
negative visceral reaction” after viewing it as “indiscriminate video 
surveillance that raises the spectre of an Orwellian state.”104 
The Fifth Circuit distinguished Ciraolo, noting that the intrusion was 
not minimal, or a “one-time overhead flight or glance over the fence by a 
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passerby.”105  Instead, the pole camera at issue allowed law enforcement 
to record “all activity” in the defendant’s backyard.106  Accordingly, the 
court interpreted Ciraolo as not “authorizing any type of surveillance 
whatever just because one type of minimally intrusive aerial observation 
is possible.”107 
The Fifth Circuit established that certain prerequisites were 
necessary for a video surveillance order in “circumstances where a 
reasonable expectation of privacy is implicated.”108  The prerequisites 
include: 
(1) the judge issuing the warrant must find that ‘normal 
investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or 
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too 
dangerous,’ (2) the warrant must contain a ‘particular description 
of the type of communication sought to be intercepted, and a 
statement of the particular offense to which it relates,’ (3) the 
warrant must not allow the period of interception to be ‘longer than 
is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization . . . or in 
any event longer than thirty days’ (though extensions are possible, 
and (4) the warrant must require that the interception ‘be 
connected in such a way as to minimize the interception of 
communications not otherwise subject to interception under [Title 
III].’109 
Essentially, these prerequisites mirror the federal statute governing 
electronic surveillance and follow the approach set out by the Second, 
Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, respectively.110  Ultimately, the 
defendant’s attempt to exclude the pole camera surveillance was 
successful since the government did not follow the above requirements.111 
2. The Tenth Circuit 
In United States v. Jackson, law enforcement suspected the 
defendants of being involved in a crack distribution ring.112  To confirm 
their suspicions, the FBI and local police set up pole cameras to surveil the 
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defendants’ residential properties.113  Law enforcement had the capability 
to adjust the pole cameras from the police station, even so far as to zoom 
in close enough to read a license plate.114  But the pole cameras could not 
record audio, and did not have the ability to view the interior of the 
properties.115 
Unlike the Fifth Circuit in Cuevas-Sanchez, the Tenth Circuit 
interpreted Ciraolo broadly.  The Tenth Circuit found that the camera 
investigation did not require a search warrant because the defendants did 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.116  Here, however, the pole 
cameras observed only what any passerby would easily observe.117 
The Tenth Circuit distinguished previous decisions that the 
defendants relied on.  Specifically, the court noted that United States v. 
Mesa-Rincon118 and United States v. Torres119 were inapplicable because 
“reasonable expectations of privacy were implicated in each.”120  In 
making its decision, the court relied upon the proposition that “aerial 
observation of a fenced-in backyard within the curtilage of a home without 
a warrant, does not violate the Fourth Amendment,” and aligned itself with 
the analysis established by the Supreme Court in Ciraolo.121 
B. Statutory Concerns – The Federal Wiretap Statute (“Title III”) 
Currently, Title III is inapplicable to video surveillance.122  
Nevertheless, a majority of the circuits have applied some of the higher 
constitutional standards of Title III to video surveillance warrants, such as 
necessity and minimization.123  Title III instructs law enforcement to 
“conduct the surveillance in such a manner as to ‘minimize’ the 
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interception” of non-relevant conversations.124  Thus, minimization is a 
question of reasonableness and depends on the facts and circumstances of 
each case.125 
In United States v. Koyomejian, law enforcement filed applications, 
supported by proper affidavits, in the district court to install hidden 
microphones and silent closed circuit television cameras (“CCTVs”) 
inside one of the defendant’s offices.126  The district court granted the 
government’s applications and the surveillance produced silent videotapes 
of multiple defendants “receiving, counting, and packaging large amounts 
of cash.”127  The Ninth Circuit confronted the question of what effect Title 
III128 and the Foreign Intelligence Act (“FISA”) had on silent video 
surveillance conducted for purely domestic purposes.129  The Ninth Circuit 
found that, by the plain meaning of the words in Title III, as well as prior 
case law and legislative history, their definitions did not apply to silent 
video surveillance.130  The district court recognized that the FISA includes 
a broad provision for “electronic surveillance,” but stated that it does not 
apply to “surveillance conducted for purely domestic purposes.”131 
While the Ninth Circuit found that Title III and FISA did not regulate 
or prohibit silent video surveillance undertaken for domestic purposes, it 
noted that the Fourth Amendment governs such surveillance.132  The court 
concluded that Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
authorizes a district court to issue warrants for silent video surveillance.133  
The court further noted that, following other circuits that have ruled on 
this issue, it was necessary to look to Title III for guidance in 
“implementing the Fourth Amendment in an area that Title III does not 
specifically cover.”134 
Along with the requirement of a finding of probable cause, the Ninth 
Circuit was confident that a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were 
protected by adopting the following requirements from Title III: 
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(1) the judge issuing the warrant must find that “normal 
investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or 
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too 
dangerous; (2) the warrant must contain “a particular description 
of the type of [activity] sought to be [videotaped], and a statement 
of the particular offense to which it relates; (3) the warrant must 
not allow the period of [surveillance] to be “longer than is 
necessary to achieve the objective of authorization, or in any event 
longer than thirty days” (though extensions are possible); and (4) 
the warrant must require that the [surveillance] “be conducted in 
such a way as to minimize the [videotaping] of [activity] not 
otherwise subject to [surveillance] . . . 135 
The Eighth Circuit addressed a similar issue in United States v. 
Falls.136  Similar to Koyomejian, law enforcement filed applications in the 
district court, supported by proper affidavits, to authorize silent CCTV 
surveillance of portions of the interior of one of the defendants’ 
apartments, as well as for a traditional “bug” to intercept oral 
communications.137  The court granted the application and the government 
subsequently engaged in both electronic oral surveillance and silent video 
surveillance of the defendant’s apartment.138 
The Eighth Circuit concluded that district courts “have the power to 
authorize silent video surveillance” where there is compliance with the 
Fourth Amendment.139  Similar to the Ninth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit 
adopted the “same standard of review for an application to engage in non-
audio video surveillance as we apply to wiretap applications [as set forth 
in Title III], which is the same standard that we apply to conventional 
warrants.”140  The court noted that it was “clear that silent video 
surveillance . . . results in a very serious, some say Orwellian, invasion of 
privacy.”141 
In alignment with the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, the Third Circuit 
came to a similar finding when confronted with video surveillance.142  In 
United States v. Williams, defendants were involved in a decades long 
gambling operation.143  The government initially conducted investigations 
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using a confidential informant and physical surveillance.144  Defendants 
did not challenge Title III or the relevant state wiretapping statute, but 
instead argued that the video surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment 
and the resulting video evidence should have been suppressed.145 
The defendants contended that the video surveillance was 
“unreasonable” because of the nature of the crimes under investigation. 146  
The Third Circuit noted that other circuit courts that have addressed video 
surveillance have held that “video surveillance conforming to the 
standards set out in Title III is constitutional.” 147  The court found no case 
suggesting that the application of these standards depends upon the nature 
of the crimes under investigation. 148  As a result, the Third Circuit flatly 
rejected defendants’ argument. 149 
The defendants further argued that the video surveillance “failed to 
meet Title III’s requirement that ‘normal investigative procedures have 
been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed 
if tried or are too dangerous.’” 150  The Third Circuit noted that the courts 
have consistently held in Title III cases that the government is not required 
to exhaust all other investigative procedures, but rather it is sufficient that 
there is evidence that “normal investigative techniques . . . reasonably 
appear to be unlucky to succeed if tried.” 151  The government is only 
required to lay a “factual predicate sufficient to inform the judge why other 
methods of investigation are not sufficient.” 152  In determining whether 
this has been satisfied, a court “may properly take into account 
affirmations which are founded in part upon the experience of specially 
trained agents.” 153 
The Third Circuit found no reason as to why the rules developed in 
previous video surveillance cases should not be applied in that case as 
well. 154  The court reviewed Falls and Mesa-Rincon, and concluded that 
“audio surveillance alone was not likely to disclose the identities of all of 
the participants and what they were doing.” 155  The Third Circuit noted 
that while it would not be advisable to use the application as a model in 
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future cases, it still satisfied constitutional requirements under the Fourth 
Amendment. 156 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 A. California v. Ciraolo Must be Broadly Interpreted in Order to 
Comport with Fourth Amendment Protections 
The Fifth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit have applied Ciraolo 
differently in video surveillance cases.157  But the Tenth Circuit’s broad 
interpretation of Ciraolo best comports with constitutional and policy 
concerns. Additionally, the broad interpretation of Ciraolo produces the 
same result under both trespass and privacy theories. 
The Fifth Circuit has distinguished Ciraolo and has viewed video 
surveillance differently than aerial surveillance.158  Specifically, the Fifth 
Circuit opined that video surveillance is not a minimal intrusion or a “one-
time overhead flight or a glance over the fence by a passerby.”159  
Accordingly, the court interpreted Ciraolo as not permitting any type of 
surveillance solely because “one type of minimally intrusive aerial 
observation is possible.” 160  This interpretation of Ciraolo is too narrow, 
and seems to disregard how the Supreme Court has historically addressed 
different types of technological advancements in the past.161 
To contrast, the Tenth Circuit takes a more practical approach by 
broadly interpreting Ciraolo.162  The Tenth Circuit posited that “the Fourth 
Amendment protection has never extended to require law enforcement to 
shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares.” 163  
This also aligns itself with the Supreme Court’s approach in cases 
subsequent to Ciraolo.  For example, this approach comports with the 
Supreme Court’s approaches in Florida v. Riley and Florida v. Jardines.164  
Therefore, looking to the cases that followed and clarified Ciraolo, video 
surveillance would be permissible as long as “intimate details” which were 
connected with the use of the home or curtilage were not observed and as 
long as the video surveillance was not “physically intrusive.”165 
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Moreover, the Supreme Court should adopt the Tenth Circuit’s broad 
interpretation of Ciraolo.  While video surveillance is similar to aerial 
observation, it is a less intrusive method than flying an airplane or 
helicopter over an individual’s home.  This broad interpretation of Ciraolo 
lends itself to a better constitutional analysis.  This interpretation of 
Ciraolo is also in alignment with past Supreme Court rulings regarding 
other technological advancements.166 
Additionally, the same results are produced regardless of whether the 
trespass or privacy theory is applied to video surveillance. Prior to its 
decision in Katz, the Supreme Court analyzed Fourth Amendment issues 
solely under the trespass theory.167  The trespass theory examines “the 
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.”168  
For example, it is permissible for the government to place a listening 
device that would allow audio surveillance of a suspect, as long as the 
government did not physically intrude on the suspect’s apartment, under 
the trespass theory.169  There is no problem for law enforcement if there is 
no trespass.170  This reasoning is akin to the false friend concept – where 
someone that you know and trust, unbeknownst to you, is cooperating with 
the government or is wired in some way.171  The Supreme Court has held 
that information revealed from a false friend relationship is consensual, 
and thus non-trespassory.172 
As technology advanced, it became less necessary for law 
enforcement to physically intrude with regard to investigative techniques.  
The trespass theory, coupled with new technology, no longer supported 
the Founding Fathers’ visions.  Due to underlying discomfort with the 
trespass theory, the Supreme Court adopted the privacy theory in Katz.  
The privacy theory encompasses the two-part Katz test, with the 
underlying theory being that “the Fourth Amendment protects people not 
places.”173  Even under Katz, the “false friend” relationship is still 
permissible.  There is no distinction between a “tattletale” and a 
“transistor,” and it is not reasonable to expect privacy when you 
voluntarily tell a third party.174 
Technology continued to advance in a post 9/11 reality, which have 
impacted an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.”  The 
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privacy theory remained the prevailing standard until United States v. 
Jones.175  For the first time since 1967, the trespass theory prevailed.176  
Justice Scalia proposed the trespass theory as an alternative theory, instead 
of a replacement for the privacy theory, with the belief that it would 
breathe life back into the Fourth Amendment.177 
In the following year in Florida v. Jardines, Justice Scalia cemented 
his support of the trespass theory, where he reiterated that society expects 
visitors to come up to your door as part of implied license. 178  Importantly, 
what the police officer did in Jardines exceeded the scope of that license 
because he was accompanied with a drug sniffing dog to investigate an 
unverified anonymous tip.179  The fact that trespass has returned in recent 
years does not eradicate the privacy theory. California v. Ciraolo and 
Florida v. Riley are prime examples of this. Since trespass was not found 
in either case, aerial surveillance without a warrant was permissible under 
the Fourth Amendment. 
Looking first to the privacy theory, courts must examine the two-part 
Katz test.  The Supreme Court has emphasized that “people not places” are 
protected.180  Thus, courts would not afford backyards such protections 
since a backyard is obviously not a person.  The courts will need to 
determine the first prong on a case-by-case basis, depending on what an 
individual did to “shield” her backyard from passersby.181  Clearly, a six-
foot outer fence and a ten-foot inner fence and a greenhouse were not 
enough to satisfy the Katz test.182  Consequently, a defendant would have 
to do something fairly extreme to assert that she manifested a subjective 
expectation of privacy.  Significantly, the second prong of the Katz test 
will consistently fail with regard to video and pole camera surveillance.  
There can be no expectation of privacy found in an area that an individual 
voluntarily exposes to the public. 
Looking next to the trespass theory, the answer is even clearer.  
Video surveillance does not constitute a physical intrusion upon an 
individual or her property.  Law enforcement never physically intrudes 
upon a defendant’s property, but rather the video cameras are installed 
outside of the residence.  The video cameras only provide police with a 
“better view.” It is well settled that the Fourth Amendment does not 
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prohibit law enforcement from “augmenting the sensory faculties 
bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and 
technology afforded them.”183  A video camera is arguably less intrusive 
than an airplane flying at an altitude of 1,000 feet or a helicopter flying at 
an altitude of 400 feet.184  This is clearly distinguishable from attaching a 
GPS device to the undercarriage of a vehicle, where there is an actual 
invasion of the physicality of the vehicle.185  Thus, video surveillance is 
permissible under both the trespass and privacy theory approaches. 
 B. The Federal Wiretap Act (“Title III”) Must be Amended to 
Encompass Video Surveillance 
For consistency in case law and to produce guidelines for law 
enforcement to abide by, the legislature should amend Title III to 
specifically encompass video surveillance.  Presently, Title III only 
governs wire, oral, and electronic surveillance methods.186  Title III is 
silent as to video surveillance, and thus inapplicable.  While the majority 
of the circuit courts have already adopted some of the requirements of Title 
III into case law, it is not enough. 
The legislature should amend Title III to include video surveillance, 
so that the Title III analysis and Fourth Amendment analysis can be 
conflated into one category. The analysis should not automatically be void 
and go directly to the Fourth Amendment analysis.  Currently, the circuit 
courts agree that while Title III is inapplicable to silent video camera 
surveillance, some of the guidelines under Title III apply to the Fourth 
Amendment analysis of such surveillance.187  Specifically, the circuits 
seem to agree that the certain requirements of Title III should apply.  First, 
the judge issuing the warrant is required to find that “normal investigative 
procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be 
unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.188  Next, the warrant 
must contain “a particular description of the type of communication sought 
to be intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it 
relates.”189  The warrant also must not permit the period of surveillance to 
be “longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization, 
or in any event longer than thirty days.”190  However, extensions for a 
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longer period of surveillance may be permitted under certain 
circumstances.191  Finally, the warrant must require that the surveillance 
“be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of 
communications not otherwise subject to interception” under Title III.192 
Specific guidelines would also minimize challenges made by 
defendants.  Since Title III does not currently address video surveillance, 
there is room for interpretation.  If video surveillance is explicitly 
mentioned within Title III, courts will easily be able to apply the analysis 
that they have essentially been construing to be applicable regardless.  
Even if Title III is not amended, case law clearly suggests that analysis 
under the Fourth Amendment will produce a nearly identical inquiry. 
 C. Future Concerns with New Surveillance Methods and Other 
Technological Advancements 
Various methods of surveillance have undergone dramatic 
technological advancements and these methods will continue to develop 
in the future. In particular, drones are quickly emerging as a new 
surveillance technology. A drone, also known as an unmanned aerial 
system (“UAS”), is an unmanned aircraft with “all of the associated 
support equipment, control station, data links, telemetry, and 
communications and navigation equipment” necessary to operate the 
unmanned aircraft.193  The unmanned aircraft is the flying portion of the 
system, flown by a pilot via a ground control system or by an on-board 
computer.194  A UAS can range from as large as a Boeing 737 to as small 
as a radio-controlled model airplane.195 
By virtue of its definition, a drone is an extension of aerial 
surveillance conducted by large airplanes.  The view from a drone is 
similar to that of an airplane overhead or arguably, the view from a pole 
camera.  Drones are certainly an example of when the courts will need to 
set certain parameters for permissible use by law enforcement. 
Legislation regarding drone usage by law enforcement has been 
limited on the federal level.  Currently, there is a ban on commercial drone 
flights.196  But certain public entities such as publically funded 
universities, law enforcement agencies, fire departments, and other 
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government agencies, can apply to the Federal Aviation Administration 
(“FAA”) for a Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (“COA”) to utilize 
drones in public aircraft operations.197  Public aircraft operations are 
permitted only for a government function.198  COAs are issued for a 
specific timespan, which is typically two years, and include special 
provisions that are individualized to each proposal, such as the defined 
block of airspace and the time of day that the drone can be used.199  While 
the average COA processing time is usually less than sixty days, expedited 
authorization is available in emergency and life-threatening situations.200 
As drones continue to increase in popularity, they will undoubtedly 
become more prominent for use by law enforcement.  Drones provide not 
only “real time situational awareness” but also help to increase officer 
safety.201  Certain law enforcement agencies already utilize drones for uses 
that include, but are not limited to, tactical operations, fire investigations 
and assessments, criminal pursuits, forensics, accident investigations, 
crime scene investigations, gathering evidence, searches and rescues, 
narcotics investigations, and suspect and vehicle tracking.202 
Due to the lack of clear regulations regarding drone usage, law 
enforcement agencies have little to no guidelines to follow.  Since drones 
are akin to pole cameras and aerial surveillance methods, the same Fourth 
Amendment analysis should be followed.  Therefore, it is essential to have 
a consistent and clear Fourth Amendment analysis for law enforcement to 
abide by. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While the text of the Fourth Amendment has remained the same, 
technologies continue to advance beyond the anticipated parameters of the 
original text.  Although video surveillance does not typically present 
constitutional or statutory problems in most scenarios, it is essential to 
address the areas that clearly are not attached to a reasonable expectation 
of privacy.  Notably, pole cameras do not allow law enforcement to 
observe anything more than a utility worker would observe if he was 
performing job-related duties atop a pole. 203  This is significant because, 
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if a reasonable expectation of privacy does not exist, the Fourth 
Amendment does not apply.204 
While the Supreme Court has not been completely silent as to the 
general topic of video surveillance, it needs to provide a clear framework 
that can be applied to emerging technologies and new methods of 
surveillance, while simultaneously complying with the Fourth 
Amendment.  As such, the Court must adopt the broad interpretation of 
Ciraolo.  This interpretation lends itself to comporting with the analysis of 
similar technological advancements and produces the same result under 
both trespass and privacy theories. 
Additionally, even though Title III provides the statutory framework 
that governs real-time electronic surveillance, it is currently inapplicable 
to video surveillance.  Accordingly, Title III must be amended by the 
legislature to include video surveillance.  Such an amendment would allow 
for consistency throughout the federal circuit courts.  But even if the 
legislature does not amend Title III, case law clearly suggests that Fourth 
Amendment analysis should be applied regardless, producing the same 
result as if Title III was amended. 
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